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The European strategy is to promote new businesses as a real 
driver of economic growth, but also to support their growth and 
resilience. A typical kind of new business is the academic start-up 
(ASU) that can play a strategic role in their local economy. This 
paper aims to contribute to the lively debate about the 
universities policies in entrepreneurial finance. In the first part, it 
investigates the strengths and weaknesses of academic start-ups 
and the role that universities have to support them in value 
creation. The authors tested the research questions on a sample 
of start-ups of the University of Pisa. The findings show 
important financial and not-financial goals of academic start-ups. 
These goals can fuel the dialogue with entrepreneurial finance 
players. Furthermore, the research shows some ASUs’ 
vulnerabilities. In conclusion, the role of universities as new 
entrepreneurial players is discussed. 
 
Key words: Academic Start-ups, Enterprise Value, Entrepreneurial 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this critical moment for the European system, 
politicians have a common goal for future 
development: innovative start-ups. As remarked by 
the European Commission Vice-President, 
entrepreneurship is also the most powerful driver of 
economic growth in economic history (2013). Over the 
past 10 years, academic scholars have also agreed and 
have emphasized the role of new companies in the 
development of scientific knowledge. They can 
promote innovation and create new jobs. They are 
essentially for the value creation of the European 
economic system (Acs et al., 2005; Armington & Acs, 
2002; Audretsch & Thurik, 2001; Carree et al., 2002; 
Davidsson & Wiklund, 2001; Johnson, 2004; Minniti et 
al., 2006; Storey, 1994; Lawton, 2000; Dahlstrand & 
Jacobsson, 2003; Clarysse et al., 2005; Mustar et al., 
2008; Mariani et al., 2018). 
A special kind of innovative start-up is the 
academic start-up (ASU) whose features make it 
different from other SMEs. In fact, academic start-
ups are firms founded by university professors or 
researchers and they can play a strategic role in the 
local economy (Benneworth & Charles, 2005; Vincett, 
2010; Iacobucci & Micozzi, 2014; Mariani et al., 
2018). Academic start-ups can produce direct effects 
(Malecki, 1997) quantifiable in new employment and 
turnover growth in the area (Etzkowitz, 2001). 
Considering that an academic start-up’s core 
business is research, some of its indirect benefits 
can contribute to the enterprise value and to 
regional economy. The production of new 
technological knowledge, partnerships, consultancy 
activities and shared assets are some non-
quantifiable drivers for growth process (Delmar & 
Wemberg, 2010). 
We can also add relations with public and 
private partners in social networking, branding of 
industry training activities, collaborations with 
international research centres, international 
exchange of students and international recognition 
of universities (Leitner, 2004; Ramírez et al., 2007; 
Cañibano & Sánchez, 2008; Sánchez et al., 2009; 
Bezhani, 2010; Bodnár et al., 2010). 
The academic start-ups have a technological 
entrepreneurship which is able to develop regional 
economies (Etzkowitz, 2001). They can promote 
regional technology clusters (Di Gregorio & Shane, 
2003) and help create a favorable environment for 
the birth and growth of new technology start-ups in 
the same areas (Lockett et al., 2003). According to 
Schumpeter (1934), entrepreneurs represent an 
important source of variation in the economic 
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system by introducing new types of goods and 
services and/or new ways of organizing their 
production.  
The creation of new technological knowledge 
and networks for access to finance (Dahlstrand, 
1999) are other important non-financial results. 
Moreover, academic start-ups can maintain links 
with the parent institutions through incubators or 
research collaborations (Heydebreck, 2000; Zomer 
et al., 2010) and create value. 
This is mainly because universities have their 
main goal the production and the dissemination of 
knowledge (Sanchez et al., 2006; Guerrero et al., 
2015). Therefore, while European policy makers are 
promoting entrepreneurship, universities are 
wondering what the role they can play as 
entrepreneurial finance players. 
According to this strategy, universities promote 
their 3rd mission, technology transfer, with a policy 
of academic start-ups (Secundo et al., 2017) 
The belief in literature is that innovative 
academic start-ups play an important function in 
Europe for both technical innovation and economic 
growth (Lawton Smith, 2000; Dahlstrand & Jacobsson, 
2003; Clarysse et al., 2005; Mustar et al., 2008; 
Kennedy & Patton, 2011). The European strategy is so 
to promote new businesses, but also to support their 
growth and resilience. Every different start-up surveys 
celebrate new births but they mourn many defaults 
also. New businesses have a high mortality, especially 
in the first years of life. If they survive, they risk being 
marginalized (COM 795: 2012). 
Considering the market-side one main 
motivation is that, in the light of the recent financial 
crisis, the limits of the European capital markets 
have emerged. In fact, the market is fragmented and 
difficult to access by small and medium-sized 
enterprises, especially for innovative start-ups. A 
large part of academic literature has highlighted the 
growth difficulties (Edelman et al., 2010) that these 
innovative companies have especially because of 
their distrust of entrepreneurial financiers and their 
lack of managerial skills. 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the role of 
universities as entrepreneurial financial players. 
After introducing the theoretical framework and 
research questions, we will discuss the findings of 
an analysis of academic start-ups of the University 
of Pisa. We first analyse their strengths and 
weaknesses as drivers of economic growth. The 
article concludes with a discussion about the role 
that universities could play to support academic 
start-ups in a logic of value creation for the regional 
system. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
 
However, some scholars have addressed the issue of 
growth difficulties that academic start-ups 
encounter during the first stages of their life cycle 
(De Jong et al., 2006; Nicolò, 2017). They have 
highlighted the weaknesses of these firms such as 
no interest in planning activities (De Jong et al., 
2006; Carlesi et al., 2017) and a low capacity for self-
criticism (Colombo et al., 2008; Van Geenhuizen 
et al., 2009; Galati et al., 2016). In fact, these firms 
guide their activities with a logic of improvisation 
because new entrepreneurs, often of scientific and 
technical training, have poor managerial culture, 
especially in financial planning and avoid R&D 
investments. Because of the low-development of a 
“financial culture”, they have to survive with modest 
financial resources (Colombo et al., 2008). They do 
not consider the strategic and critical role of 
working capital management, so they live in an 
unstable financial equilibrium (Carlesi et al., 2017). 
They finance their activity essentially with short-
term bank debts (Bellavitis et al., 2017). Small and 
medium-sized unlisted companies find it difficult to 
obtain traditional financing through long-term bank 
loans and they do not have access to capital through 
the stock market. Some research has found, in fact, 
that innovative new businesses, while lively and 
bearers of value to the economic system, have a high 
mortality, especially in the first years of life, or they 
survive under limited conditions. High-tech 
academic spin-offs tend to remain small for a long 
time or to grow slowly (Salvador, 2006; Clarysse 
et al., 2011; Galati et al., 2016). According to this 
discussion, our first research question is: 
RQ
1
: What weaknesses and strengths of 
academic start-ups’ are important for 
entrepreneurial finance? 
Some research has highlighted that one on two 
new businesses fail during the first five years and 
anyway they remain small. The European strategy is 
to promote new businesses but also to support their 
growth and resilience (COM 2012:0795). 
To safeguard and enhance the competitiveness 
of SMEs in the EU economy, the European 
Commission has already adopted a clear strategy 
with the Small Business Act for Europe (SBA - June 
2008) and communication on Long-Term Financing 
of the European Economy (March 2014). One of the 
main objectives of the “Europe 2020 Strategy” 
(March 2013) is to ensure SMEs have full access to 
the credit markets and capital in Europe. The Capital 
Markets Union (CMU) aims to expand the range of 
financing options for growing businesses, which 
include academic start-ups, to increase resources for 
innovation, for innovative start-ups and for non-
listed companies. The European Commission 
explains in the “Action Plan on Building a Capital 
Markets Union” (2015) how to promote an 
entrepreneurial finance development. An important 
aim is to encourage venture capital (through tax 
incentives) and raise equity capital by reducing 
listing costs and overcoming information barriers to 
SMEs investment. Another goal is to reduce barriers 
for companies which want enter and raise capital in 
public markets by promoting innovative forms of 
corporate financing, like crowdfunding, and 
developing a coordinated approach to loan 
origination by funds. 
This debate includes the role of universities as 
entrepreneurial finance players. Etzkowitz in his 
seminal work (1983) fuels the debate on 
entrepreneurial universities role. Universities now 
have the important task of fostering innovation and 
technological transformation, technology has led to 
many social implications, over the years. University 
has been given the responsibility function of socio-
economic development and, thus, it is a guide for 
society (Etzkowitz, 2001; Etzkowitz & Klofsten, 
2005). Pointing to this new and third role of 
universities, both scholars and policymakers have 
begun to refer to an “entrepreneurial university” 
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model (Etzkowitz, 2003; European Union, 2012) that 
implies also an active part in term of entrepreneurial 
finance (Block et al., 2018).  
The third mission of universities covers all of 
the activities through which they contribute to 
innovation and social change. There exist several 
contributions in the literature that have identified 
the activities that compose the third mission and its 
benefits, in particular, on the local level (Huggins & 
Johnston, 2009; Trequattrini et al., 2015). According 
to Seguí-Mas, Mas et al. (2017) specific training in 
managerial competencies to potential academic 
entrepreneurs is advised to universities to promote 
successful knowledge transfer via spin-offs. One of 
the most important effects is their ability to convert 
the knowledge that is created through research into 
a business idea, by creating an industry-university 
collaboration (Etzkowitz, 2003; Green Paper, 2012). 
The rate of creation of new firms and their 
performance are measures of university 
entrepreneurship (Chiesa & Piccaluga, 2000; Di 
Gregorio & Shane, 2003; Clarysee et al., 2005; Leitch 
& Harrison, 2005; Link & Scott, 2005; O’Shea et al., 
2005). Given this discussion, the second research 
question is: 
RQ
2
: What role can universities play in 
entrepreneurial finance? 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
In the lively debate on what kind of value drivers the 
innovative start-ups can share with entrepreneurial 
finance investors, we studied a sample of University 
of Pisa Academic start-ups. We developed two 
complementary levels of study to measure financial 
and non-financial goals. As regards financial goals, 
we defined two perspectives: performance and value 
creation1. With the analysis of Performance Indexes, 
via financial documents, the focus was on ex-post 
results to outline a snapshot of a company’s health. 
The Enterprise Value, instead, via business plans and 
questionnaires, gave a prospective vision of the 
value creation, according to the private equity 
perspective (Damodoran, 1999). The interviews were 
essential developed to capture non-financial goals, 
represented by the number of patents and awards, 
the number of research projects, the place where 
they made physical investments, the number of 
partnerships and/or the participation in 
associations, the presence of managerial skilled staff 
in the firms, etc. In these value drivers, the social 
impact plays a strategic role. 
The University of Pisa’s start-up population is 
30 units (in 2016). In order to define enterprise 
value, we selected only those that presented at least 
one balance sheet and a three-year business plan. We 
had to exclude two companies in liquidation, four 
because they were still unstructured and 3 did not 
collaborate. The final sample consisted of 21 well- 
structured companies, whose characteristics were 
representative of the population, although they 
differed regarding age, industry, and activity type 
(Table 1). In any case, they were all innovative start-
ups, by Italian law Definire.  
 
                                                          
1 According to Damodoran (1999), in the last decade, managers seem to have 
come around to the view that value maximization should be, if not the only, at 
least the primary objective for their firms. In a generic model of value, we 
relate value to expected cash flows in the future and consider all of he 
potential routes that are available for a firm to create value.  
Table 1. Descriptive data of the sample 
 
ID 
Year of 
birth 
Industry 
Sales 
(year 2016) 
n° of 
employees 
A 2007 Engineering 392,446 5 
B 2008 Engineering 476,459 10 
C 2013 Life 28,150 0 
D 2010 Life 36,365 0 
E 2012 Life 27,930 1 
F 2014 ICT 37,750 1 
G 2014 Life 7,867 0 
H 2013 ICT 0 0 
I 2011 ICT 400,171 3 
J 2011 Engineering 100,738 1 
K 2003 
Advanced 
Instruments 
103,544 7 
L 2006 ICT 736,647 7 
M 2011 
New 
materials 
106,740 1 
N 2012 Life 43,000 0 
O 2011 
Advanced 
Instruments 
102,508 n.d. 
P 2011 Engineering 83,896 0 
Q 2009 Engineering 16,639 1 
R 2011 
Advanced 
Instruments 
576,918 11 
S 2009 
New 
materials 
143,678 1 
T 1997 
Advanced 
Instruments 
3,965,353 50 
U 2009 
Energy & 
Environment 
200,728 2 
 
This new entrepreneurial experience of the 
University of Pisa is relatively young, with an average 
age of 6 years. We can underline that the oldest 
start-up was incorporated in 1991, but the majority 
(17) structured from 2011 (an average of four new 
companies per year. (Table 2). 
In consideration of the fact that our research 
had a dynamic focus, with the aim to map the 
growth intentions of entrepreneurial firms, rather 
than the setting-up, we defined three subsamples, on 
the basis of age. 
1) NEW, 12 units, ASOs operating for less than 
three years;  
2) JUNIOR, 6 units, operating from 3-7 years; 
3) SENIOR, 3 units, operating for more than 7 
years. 
The academic start-ups realized a total 
turnover of 8 million, with an average of around 
400,000 euros per company (2016) and 7,000 euros 
minimum while the maximum values were, of 
course, in the Senior group, with a peak of 4 million. 
Overall, the University of Pisa’s academic start-
ups somewhat foreshadows of a research-oriented 
medium-sized company, with a total of 101 
employees (of which 57 new high-tech jobs were 
created in the last four years). The employee average 
per firm was 5, but in the group of Seniors, the 3 
companies had reached a larger size, and they 
currently operate with an average of 21 employees. 
As mentioned above, the companies of the 
sample were, as expected, essentially research 
oriented. Almost all of the entrepreneurs also had an 
academic activity and, in 2016, they invested about 2 
million in R&D for, with only 1 million promoted by 
the 3 Senior start-ups. During the interviews, the 
team declared that the principal research activity 
was for new products and new technological 
solutions, with the direct involvement of 
researchers, graduate students and fellows (with a 
focus on technological aspects). 
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Table 2. The financial goals of Academic start-ups (2016) 
 
 NEW YOUNG SENIOR TOTAL 
N° companies 12 6 3 21 
Performance indexes 
Turnover 2,270,056 1,333,212 4,527,934 8,131,202 
Turnover per company 18,171 222,202 1,509,311 387,200 
Employees 21 17 63 101 
ROA 14.75 7.17 2.98  
Leverage 2.20 4.70 2.70  
Financial Debts Short Term/ 
Total Financial Debts 
71% 91% 90%  
Interests/Ebit 3% 6% 4%  
Working Capital Cycle 19 71 63  
Value creation 
Enterprise Value 11,149,112 4,157,359 5,876,502 18,430,794 
Enterprise Value per company 712,373 617,694 2,342,517 918,199 
Other information 
R&D investments 557,534 246,550 1,028,509 1,832,593 
R&D investments per company 46,461 41,092 342,836 87,626 
 
Similar considerations were valid in the 
performance analysis. In ASU’s, young age, sectoral 
specificities and simplified form of the financial 
statements drafted (in short form) are elements that 
made the performance study difficult. We obtained 
expressive values only for ROA and they were quite 
large values, going from zero to 33%. Within the 
sample, it is above all the Younger companies that 
had the highest return on investment (14.75%). It 
was clear that the high value of the index was above 
all due to the low capital invested. The Senior 
companies, on the other hand, while noting a rather 
contained ROA, required careful reading. The more 
structured firms had a higher capital invested, both 
for intangible and tangible assets. In addition, the 
preparation of the financial statements was more 
complete and guided by optimizing financial 
statements to reach positive results. 
As regards the second perspective, value 
creation, we opted for the Enterprise Value (EV) to 
express the value created by innovation investments. 
In this typology of the firm, the Enterprises Value 
captures the essence of the innovativeness value of 
the team, the real asset of the innovative 
entrepreneurial firms and the value driver that 
entrepreneurial finance players appreciate. In order 
to capture every value drivers, it is necessary to 
integrate several methodologies. Normally, 
practitioners adopt at least two methodologies: one 
is accounting based and the second on market data.  
We must bear in mind that the ASUs operate in 
an industry with high uncertainty and they do not 
have an operating history on which to project future 
expectations. In addition, the preponderance of 
intangible assets are determinant for value estimation 
(R&D, patents, know-how, etc.). Therefore, we 
adopted four methodologies that addressed all the 
value drivers: a discounted cash flow (DCF), the 
income method from an accounting perspective, the 
multiples method, and the venture capital approach 
for company market value. The venture capital 
approach is one of the most recommended 
evaluation methods for start-ups (Damodaran, 2007; 
2011) because it focuses on the potential value of 
the company on the exit date foreseen for the 
Venture Capitalist (Sahlman & Scherlis, 1987), 
traditionally attracted by innovative start-ups. With 
the four values, it is possible to obtain the value 
both for the market and for investors (venture 
capitalists). We tested our data using the above four 
methods and ended up with four values for each 
firm of the sample. We used these four values to 
show two averages: the mathematical mean and the 
weighted mean. It is highly accepted by accounting 
practitioners that both DCF and income method 
have an index of 35% each, while 15% for multiples 
method and for the venture capital approach 
(Mariani et al., 2018). We took all the data required 
for the calculation of the cost of capital (to use the 
discount flows) from the open database of 
Damodaran’s website2,3. By following the practice of 
business evaluation, we adjusted the data to take 
into account the firms’ specific characteristics. By 
using the four above-mentioned methodologies, we 
were able to assess the firms’ more tangible assets 
(cash flow, income, etc.), and their intangible ones 
(industry performance, R&D investments, number of 
patents, etc.).  
The Academic start-ups of the University of 
Pisa express a weighted value of 18,430,794 euros. 
The Income Method value is the minimum while the 
Venture Capital Approach shows the highest. A 
start-up enterprise value is essentially expressed by 
future perspectives, so market-based methods are 
more able to express the value better but more 
uncertain.  
Another element that deserves notice is that 
the maximum Enterprise values (6 firms earned 
more than a million in EV) were not only among the 
Seniors (4) but 2 belonged to the first group. They 
were in the early stages and operating in ICT: a 
sector that expressed the best sales trend in the 
period (Deloitte, 2016). 
According to Block et al. (2018), new players in 
entrepreneurial finance are also interested in non-
financial goals that can capture the value of 
innovative entrepreneurial firms better. These news 
                                                          
2 In Italian law, innovative start-ups are: companies with shared capital (i.e. 
limited companies), including cooperatives, the shares or significant 
registered capital shares of which are not listed on a regulated market nor on a 
multilateral negotiation system. These companies must also meet the 
following requirements: – be new or have been operational for less than 5 
years; – have their headquarters in Italy or in another EU country, but with at 
least a production site branch in Italy; – have a yearly turnover lower than 5 
million Euros; – do not distribute profits; -produce, develop and 
commercialize innovative goods or services of high technological value; - are 
not the result of a merger, split-up or selling-off of a company or branch; – be 
of innovative character, which can be identified by at least one of the 
following criteria: 1. at least 15% of the company’s expenses can be attributed 
to R&D activities; 2. at least 1/3 of the total workforce are PhD students, the 
holders of a PhD or researchers; alternatively, 2/3 of the total workforce must 
hold a Master’s degree; 3. the enterprise is the holder, depositary or licensee 
of a registered patent (industrial property) or the owner of a program for 
original registered computers. Support measures apply to newly established 
companies for the first 5 years of activity, provided that they meet the 
aforementioned requirements. 
3 http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ 
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innovative companies capitalise their abilities with 
research grants, patents, international conferences 
and networks and they have invested in managerial 
training. They invest both in research activities and 
in managerial skills (Table 4). This kind of 
progressive evolution of the two souls of an 
innovative entrepreneurial firm enabled 4 of the 
“News” to involve new international partners; while 
18 academic start-ups attracted non-academic 
partners. Enterprise value methods can express 
these non-financial results and they are the real key 
of their future value (the value drivers of an 
academic entrepreneurial firm able to manage a 
trend of growth). Entrepreneurial finance players 
seek new companies with high growth opportunities. 
 
Table 3. Academic start-ups enterprise value (2016) 
 
  New Junior Senior Total 
DCF 8 163 961 4 889 742 5 587 298 18 641 003 
Income method 8 175 287 4 778 558 2 712 554 15 666 400 
Multiplies method 10 314 389 3 489 864 7 033 035 20 837 288 
Venture capital approach 7 540 250 1 666 491 12 777 319 21 984 061 
Mathematical mean 11 408 864 3 706 164 7 027 552 19 282 188 
Weighted mean 11 149 112 4 157 358 5 876 501 18 430 793 
 
Table 4. Non-financial goals of Academic start-ups (2016) 
 
 
Research 
Grants 
Patents Grants 
International 
conference 
partecipation 
Business 
associations 
partecipation 
Foreing 
investors 
(1=si; 
0=no) 
Foreing 
shareholders 
(persone 
fisiche) 
Non-
university 
shareholders 
Managerial 
training 
Professionals 
Managers 
New 50 18 20 43 21 4 6 10 6 9 
Young 15 6 4 13 12 0 0 6 1 5 
Senior 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 2 3 3 
Total 67 24 26 56 34 4 6 18 10 17 
 
4. SOME ACADEMIC START-UP WEAKNESSES 
 
During the interviews, we noted that top 
management almost predominantly had figures with 
scientific know-how and managerial training 
(Salvador, 2006; Clarysse et al., 2011; Galati et al., 
2016; Mariani et al., 2018). The planning activities, in 
fact, were not structured and they often focused on 
the drafting of European projects. All the companies 
had to draw up a business plan for the recognition 
procedure for spin-off brand, but only about half of 
them recognized its strategic importance for 
decision-making purposes and progressively 
updated the forecasts. In fact, they guided the 
activities with a logic of improvisation; the new 
entrepreneurs, often of scientific and technical 
training, had poor managerial culture, especially in 
financial planning and did not want delegate or to 
involve managerial professionals. They decided to 
avoid new investments, including in R&D. In this 
view, managerial culture could be considered an 
element that devises the two perspectives. With a 
correct managerial, especially for financially 
government, the firms are able to promote the 
research activities. We also found that most of them 
prefer to use their own resources (typical friends 
and family), or research funding, from EU, which 
affect their development skills. 
In line with Bellavitis et al. (2017), our survey 
showed that our ASUs prefer traditional debts. In 
our sample, short-term bank debt prevails in their 
financial structure, with more than 75%! However, 
the financial exposure of companies does not have 
critical effects on economic risk. Financial interests 
have a limited weight on EBIT, above all because 
academic start-ups mainly have different forms of 
concessional financing: European funds, government 
and regional funding, university financial support 
and also chambers of commerce equity.  
The management of working capital has 
particular connotations. Our academic start-ups had 
a business where a warehouse is not necessary, such 
as when the product is an app or software. It was 
possible to calculate the cycle of working capital 
only for 8 companies that did not present alarming 
data (Table 1, 2). On the contrary, the values of the 
working capital cycle were quite limited. It should be 
noted that this equilibrium is a random situation. 
However, from the interviews carried out, we found 
that they did not consider the strategic and critical 
role of working capital management, so they 
survived in an unstable financial equilibrium, 
frequently feeding an insolvent state.  
 
5. DISCUSSION  
 
The innovative academic start-ups of our study 
achieved interesting innovations, registered patents 
and earned an active part in international scientific 
networks, fertilizing opportunities for growth and 
expansion. Gradually these firms have progressively 
developed managerial activities and realized 
interesting results. We found that where researchers 
promoted and invested in "cultural metamorphosis" 
and fertilized an entrepreneurial mind-set, did their 
academic start-ups become real businesses, growing 
and reducing their rate of bankruptcy. In the first 3-
5 years, the NEW entrepreneurs mainly followed 
“researcher’s vision”, devoting themselves almost 
exclusively to refining their research projects. In this 
phase, they made few investments (mainly R&D) and 
essentially worked with their "traditional" research 
team and always within university laboratories. In 
fact, their business did not change the role of the 
academic research unit. They only elaborated a 
business plan to obtain the Academic Spin-off brand 
(which is often not developed in the economic and 
financial analysis).  
The excitement for new starting is high; there 
are situations in which the firms have already 
obtained interesting (but still isolated) awards and 
market successes. 
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The Junior group progressively began to show 
interest in other business strategies, including 
strategic planning, where scientists/entrepreneurs 
can practice their high mathematical skills. They feel 
the need for external personnel with managerial 
skills, above all to support the management of 
research projects and partnerships with other 
companies. This primordial managerial evolution, 
however, is not yet structured and it delegated to 
external figures, essentially in staff, or sometimes 
self-made within the entrepreneurial group, which, 
in light of the high scientific professionalism, 
believes that the day by day managerial know-how 
will develop autonomously within the company. 
The Junior start-ups are not yet interested in 
growth strategies. The scientists/entrepreneurs 
prefer to maintain their status quo and not expand 
the company structure and the organization chart, 
fearing that they will not be able to control. Their 
link with the University is still very strong and the 
projects continue to be supported by making use of 
the various researchers (undergraduates, doctoral 
students, scholarship holders) without taking 
responsibility for decision-making. At some point, 
however, situations are created in which successes 
and networks “fertilized” for years impose some 
options. The firms can develop real growth projects 
becoming a SENIOR company or maintain the same 
status quo, by living a chronic phase of as sort of 
“Peter Pan” entrepreneurial syndrome. This second 
option will degenerate in default or in liquidation of 
the company. The virtual entrepreneurs are not able 
to manage in a concerted way something that is no 
longer just research. They often escape from the 
growth of complexity and prefer to be only 
university researchers. 
In the more structured, Senior group, we 
identified the three cases of firms. For two of them 
(which despite having achieved interesting results, and 
being in fact in a development phase) the business 
team has crumbled, failing to find an internal 
organization and not wanting to insert qualified 
managerial figures. Then, there are some firms, which 
continue to devote themselves day by day and to keep 
the “umbilical cord” strong with the university and 
they see the company as a way to simplify the 
management of external research projects. 
In some cases, however, they have taken off by 
structuring their company organization with the 
entry of managerial figures, dedicated to financial 
management and planning, thanks also to industrial 
and equity financiers, even foreign. They proceed to 
plan investments, introduce governance practices 
and grow both in terms of turnover and employees 
(with operational offices also abroad). The value 
creation aim is metabolized and in this case, the 
scientist’s DNA is perfectly integrated with the 
managerial gene.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In this evolutionary process the university system, 
with its third mission, is called to play an important 
role as an accelerator of entrepreneurial 
metamorphosis, promoting an entrepreneurial mind-
set. In the lively debate on the role that an 
entrepreneurial university can play on the economic 
system, some scholars have measured their social 
enrichment by multiplier logic means. Elliott et al. 
(1988) have highlighted that regional multipliers 
usually have a magnitude of about two. Siegfried et al. 
(2007) reveal by analysing 21 impact studies, the 
multiplier ranges from 1.32 to 4.75, with a median of 
1.8. Mariani et al. (2018), by defining a multiplier ad 
hoc, showed the multiplier effects of the University of 
Pisa investments in innovation in 2.74 in terms of 
wealth created on the regional area. 
Universities can play an important role in 
entrepreneurial finance and, as underlined above, 
they could have a high social impact. The question is 
what kind of players are they? In our survey (and on 
the basis of other research), we can say that university 
support of academic start-ups is not so much to 
promote their birth but to side-line their growth. 
Academic start-ups need to overcome their 
difficulties of transforming innovative ideas and 
knowledge into business opportunities. They must 
reinforce their capacity to manage uncertainty, to 
become going beyond the logic of improvisation and 
overcoming poor managerial culture as new potential 
entrepreneurs. New enterprises, young entrepreneurs 
and start-ups need to be empowered in terms of their 
ability to compete in an evolving market, bringing 
new ideas that follow technological growth. Hence, 
future education and training approaches should 
embrace the emerging paradigms that reinforce 
resilience, encourage innovation and can stimulate 
real start-ups development. According to “Europe 
2020 Strategy” (March 2013), new companies need to 
develop the ability to communicate with different 
type of financiers (venture capitalists, bank systems, 
financial market players). 
In line with Block et al. (2018), universities can 
be essential partners for academic start-ups with a 
different role according to firm life cycle. In the seed 
and early stages, (the New group) universities could 
maximize their role with managerial and financial 
support. The first task is to fertilize an 
entrepreneurial mind-set and to discover and 
translate research ideas into entrepreneurial 
initiatives. For this purpose, there have to be 
entrepreneurial culture programs within higher 
education institution, in order to stimulate students 
and researchers to develop the necessary skills and 
knowledge to industrialize their ideas with a 
business approach and raise the number of new 
firms with a long-term success. 
In the seed and early stages, universities could 
also promote their funds for academic start-ups, 
with the collaboration of banks and equity players, 
to define different financing models, by mixing 
revolving funds, traditional equity and debt, 
according to the specific market and activity of the 
new firms.  
Then the academic support system must evolve 
towards a coaching role, to reinforce start-up and 
young company resiliency against economic 
troubles, by reducing the risk of failures because of 
insufficient managerial skills and from the inability 
to manage uncertainty, through a fruitful exchange 
of knowledge and competencies. The university has 
to raise the awareness of present and future 
entrepreneurs towards a growth-oriented managerial 
culture. In this phase, concessional funds must 
make way for market financial players because start-
ups must evolve managerially. 
Excessive financial support, with concessional 
conditions, can limit growth because new companies 
avoid more evolved partnerships with new 
entrepreneurial finance players that want a real 
market vision. Furthermore, financial support could 
play a caring role, degenerating in the “therapeutic 
Journal of Governance and Regulation / Volume 7, Issue 4, 2018 
 
25 
obstinacy” towards financial critical situations. In 
this direction, an essentially university-managed 
approach could produce some important effects, by 
raising awareness and guiding present and future 
managers and entrepreneurs to deal with 
uncertainty, to assume a long-term perspective, to 
promote start-ups with a real growth trend and to 
reinforce a start-up’s “immune system” against 
economic troubles. By metabolizing a real 
entrepreneurial mind-set, young entrepreneurs 
could remove their chronic “information knots” that 
characterize their relationship with institutional 
investors. Academic start-ups must become real 
ventures.  
We are aware of some limitations of this 
investigation. The considerations that emerged in this 
research have uncovered more in-depth insights that 
this research group is now investigating. We are 
promoting some case studies to investigate intangible 
value drivers in this kind of companies. On the other 
hand, our research method could be applied to study 
the cases of other Italian and European universities in 
order to compare the different spin-offs universities 
policies and their results. 
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